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Scientific standardisation is a term requiring anything but further clarification. Both in legal and in 
scientific environments, the development of scientific standards has been strongly encouraged for 
quite some time. From a scientific point of view, efforts have been made both on a European and a 
global scale. The endeavours undertaken by the ENFSI (European Network of Forensic Science 
Institutes) Working Groups and Standing Committees (especially the Quality and Competence 
Committee) as well as actions by the organisations engaged at a geographically larger level, such as 
the ISO (17025 Accreditation requirement for testing laboratories) slowly find their way to the pencil 
of the European legislator. However, as the latter continues to focus predominantly on DNA evidence 
- turning a blind eye to the vast range of other forensic disciplines – European ‘legislating’ of scientific 
standards remains rather limited altogether. 
From a legal point of view, the importance of scientific standards should not be underestimated or 
disregarded, since how and by whom forensic evidence has been gathered impacts upon the 
subsequent (non-)acceptance thereof in court. Explicit admissibility criteria have been developed in 
the US. In particular, the cases of Frye v. the United States (1923) and Daubert v. Merrel Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) served as pioneers in the continuous discussion on both the conditions 
for legal admissibility and the person(s) competent to decide on this. Whilst common law regimes such 
as England have followed this lead, other European legal systems work with an inconsistent and 
confusing set of implicit criteria that might affect the acceptance of the forensic evidence in the 
courtroom, but might just as well be passed on to the judge and merely influence (at best) its probative 
value. 
The lack of European reflection on admissibility criteria is regrettable, particularly in view of the 
relentless attempts to ascertain mutual admissibility of evidence on a European level. In line with the 
mutual recognition principle in criminal matters, introduced at the 1999 Tampere Summit, the 
European Commission has already in 2003 voiced the idea that evidence lawfully gathered in one 
member state should be admissible before the courts of other member states. Until date, such free 
circulation or free movement of evidence has not been realized. Over the years, both the European 
legislator and scholars have stressed the importance of mutual admissibility of evidence for the 
forensic field. In 2009, the Stockholm Programme linked the idea to the development of common 
forensic quality standards, a change that should be seen in the context of the new competences 
granted by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Since this Treaty, Article 82.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) makes it possible for the European legislator(s) to achieve mutual 
admissibility of evidence through harmonization by introducing common binding legal minimum 
standards in the domestic legal orders of the member states. Free movement of forensic evidence thus 
being both desired and legally possible, the question invariably arises as to why no break-through has 
been reached until date.  
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The essential hurdle for mutual cross-border admissibility of forensic evidence seems to be the 
requisite cooperation between the scientific and the legal communities, since both lay down 
requirements which, if not observed, may lead to rejection of the evidence in court. Quite obviously, 
the quality of  forensic investigation, in terms of both forensic investigators/researchers and 
measures/techniques, is key. In addition, however, traditional legal principles of investigation in 
criminal matters need to be complied with, hence creating an equilibrium between the competences 
of crime-fighting authorities on the one hand and the (defence) rights of ‘affected’ individuals on the 
other. A combined cross-disciplinary (scientific-legal) approach will likely depend on the successful 
integration of four components in the envisaged minimum standards. 
From a scientific point of view, admissibility depends on the quality of the actions performed and the 
actors performing them. Firstly, the ‘actions performed’ refer to both the standards for forensic 
examination (treatment of materials tested and analytical techniques used to gather or examine 
certain materials) as well as the interpretation of the forensic examination results. All of these 
elements should be sufficiently regulated in order to consider the evidence resulting from these 
actions scientifically reliable. Secondly, forensic evidence cannot be considered qualitative insofar the 
actors performing the actions concerned are not capable and/or competent to do so. Within this 
context, ‘actors’ are to be interpreted in a broad manner. Not only the proficiency of individual 
investigators/researchers gathering or analysing the forensic evidence (which depends on their 
education, training and experience), but also of the laboratory or the federation in which they function 
determine the reliability and objectivity of the evidence.  
From a legal point of view, an equilibrium or fair balance between government and individual is a 
necessary prerequisite for legal admissibility. Firstly, the objective law implies that the government 
should be granted a certain degree of flexibility in adopting procedural rules, but sees its discretionary 
competences limited by the traditional ‘proportionality principle’. With regard to forensic evidence, 
this principle will for instance imply that preservation of DNA samples is possible but cannot be 
arbitrary or for non-legitimate purposes (see also the ECHR-case of S. and Marper v. the United 
Kingdom of 4 December 2008). Secondly, whenever a forensic investigative measure has passed the 
first legal test and can be executed, the individual affected by this measure should be granted sufficient 
subjective or defence rights in order to consider the criminal proceedings fair. This is where the 
cornerstones protecting the individual’s legal position (such as the right not to incriminate oneself or 
to be properly informed) must be situated. These procedural safeguards are closely connected with 
the reliability component mentioned above, as the lack of such safeguards may cast doubt on the 
‘legal’ reliability of the actions performed, relating for instance to the possibility of retesting a sample 
and the possibility of a reliability assessment by a legal authority. 
Notwithstanding efforts undertaken in both legal and scientific spheres, a great deal of work remains 
to be done before mutual cross-border admissibility of forensic evidence becomes reality. For both 
science and the law to overcome one’s own boundaries and to join forces is urgent. The above-
sketched four component approach seems the way to go, in particular for the EU, probably on a more 
global scale.  
